We should all celebrate success; well done.
The work of avalanche professionals, educators, forecasters, rescuers, and the entire backcountry community is essential for our backcountry community and the public. Every improvement in forecasting, education, rescue, and communication represents people trying to help others make better decisions and come home. We all share that mission. The intent of educators, forecasters, and pros to serve and protect is not being questioned; the system design is.
Celebration must exist alongside humility. Most seasons, Colorado leads the nation in avalanche fatalities.
More than 179 people died in avalanches this year in North America and Europe. Those losses are not numbers alone. They are people – sons, daughters, mothers, and fathers, families, friends, guides, and communities. Their lessons must not be forgotten. They must become the foundation for how we continue to improve, not merely thoughts and prayers, but a reminder that deviation from the now is deadly.
When we enter avalanche terrain, we are entering HARM’S WAY!
The backcountry cannot be made safe. It is a complex adaptive environment where uncertainty, variability, and consequence are always present. The goal is not eliminating uncertainty; in an inherently uncertain system, that is impossible. But is it a rational expectation to call it “safety” then, since safety is not a neutral neurochemical operator?
The goal then must be educating, training and forecasting to the level of competence required to operate within it.
A common safety response is:
Risk exists → Remove exposure → Risk decreases
Sometimes this is exactly correct. We shut down unsafe equipment, isolate dangerous areas, and stop operations during extreme conditions.
The problem occurs when the intervention becomes the default solution:
All uncertainty → Remove participation
Because removing exposure also removes practice, feedback, calibration, and competence development.
The paradox becomes:
Less exposure → Less learning → Lower adaptive capability
A fence around the pool can prevent immediate harm. But if the fence becomes the entire system, people never learn the water. They never learn the currents. They never develop the awareness required to know when entering the pool is appropriate.
The answer is not removing the fence. The answer is teaching people why the fence exists, when it belongs there, and how to recognize when conditions change.
The goal is not unlimited access.
The goal is competence.
Avalanche science has already shown this is not only a snow problem. McCammon’s research examined the role of training, heuristic traps, decision tools, and human factors in recreational avalanche accidents. McCammon and McNeil examined risk management trends in U.S. backcountry avalanche accidents among skiers and snowboarders. McNeil et al. examined backcountry behaviors after participation in a recreational avalanche course, contributing to understanding how education, training, and human decision-making interact within avalanche risk systems.
The question is not simply, “Why did a person make the wrong choice?”
The deeper question is:
“What system shaped the decision environment that person was operating within?”
Humans do not operate in isolation. Humans operate through systems.
Forecasts, ratings, maps, language, training, and experience become the references people use to make decisions.
Claude Shannon’s information theory demonstrated that communication systems must preserve meaningful information as information moves through compression and transmission. The challenge is not providing unlimited information. Humans cannot process unlimited information. The challenge is preserving the information that changes decisions.
A forecast is not the mountain. A rating is not the snowpack. A symbol is not reality. They are tools designed to help humans interact with reality. The system succeeds when those tools maintain connection with the environment.
The pieces already exist: forecasting, education, terrain assessment, field observations, mentorship, experience, and decision-making.
The opportunity is connecting them.
Restoring the feedback loop:
Forecast → Conditions → Observation → Interpretation → Decision → Action → Outcome → Feedback → Update
A continuous learning system.
Nancy Leveson’s systems engineering research through System III, a new theory-based system approach to safety and risk management, shows that accidents often emerge from interactions between components rather than from one individual failure. She further states that complexity management is the tool for environmental systems management. Safety is created through system design, feedback, and appropriate constraints. Erik Hollnagel’s resilience engineering work shows that successful systems do not eliminate uncertainty; they develop the ability to adapt when reality changes.
This is the opportunity before avalanche education and forecasting.
Not simply communicating where problems exist.
Helping people understand how to operate within the conditions that exist.
High-consequence fields understand this. Military operations, aviation, medicine, and emergency response do not create capable operators by removing all exposure to complexity. They build capability through preparation, standards, communication, practice, feedback, and adaptation.
Discipline is not blind obedience.
Discipline is the ability to perform when reality changes.
Gary Klein’s naturalistic decision-making research demonstrated that experts develop judgment through experience, pattern recognition, and feedback from real environments. Anders Ericsson’s research on deliberate practice showed that expertise develops through structured interaction with meaningful feedback.
The mountain requires the same.
The backcountry cannot be made safe. But the system around it can become better connected.
A forecast should not only communicate where problems exist. It should also help people understand what objectives fit today’s conditions, where people can travel while maintaining margin, what observations should verify the forecast, what terrain provides the right learning opportunity, and what success looks like today.
Show the process.
Show the observations.
Show the decisions.
Use the forecast as a rudder, not an anchor.
An anchor stops movement.
A rudder allows adaptation.
The mountains are not the enemy.
The uncertainty is the challenge.
The responsibility of those who have spent their lives studying this environment is not to promise control over something uncontrollable. It is to lead the next generation into mastery of adaptation.
To connect forecasting, education, mentorship, experience, and feedback into one continuous learning system.
To be the guides.
The mentors.
The masters of the craft.
Because the ultimate mission remains the same: Helping people come home. With the full toolbox that just might be possible!
References
CAIC, Eaws, AvyCan Fatality data
McCammon, I.: The role of training in recreational avalanche accidents in the United States, Proc. Int. Snow Sci. Workshop, Big Sky, MT, 37–45, 2000.
McCammon, I.: Evidence of heuristic traps in recreational avalanche accidents, Proc. Int. Snow Sci. Workshop, Penticton, BC, 244–251, 2002.
McCammon, I., Heuristic traps in recreational avalanche accidents: Evidence and implications. Avalanche News, 68, 42–50.2004
McCammon, I. M., & Haegeli, P. An evaluation of rule‑based decision tools for travel in avalanche terrain. Cold Regions Science and Technology, 47(1–2), 193–206. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.coldregions.2006.08.007, 2007.
McCammon, I. and McNeil, K. RISK MANAGEMENT TRENDS IN U.S. BACKCOUNTRY AVALANCHE ACCIDENTS: SKIERS AND SNOWBOARDERS, Proc. Int’l Snow Science Workshop, 1473-1480, 2024
McNeil, K. R., Morgan, J. A., Riggs Meder, L. Y., and Walker, E. R.: Understanding backcountry behaviors after participation in a recreational avalanche course, in: Proceedings of the International Snow Science Workshop, Bend, Oregon, USA, 8–13 October 2023, 1112–1119, https://arc.lib.montana.edu/snow-science/objects/ISSW2023_O12.01.pdf, 2023.
Kahneman, D.: Thinking, Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, USA, ISBN 978-0374275631, 2011
Klein, G.: Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 336 pp., ISBN 9780262611466, 1998.
Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. T., and Tesch-Römer, C.: The Role of Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance, Psychological Review, 1993.
Leveson, N.: Safety III: A Systems Approach to Safety and Resilience, MIT Engineering Systems Laboratory, 2020,
Hollnagel, E.: Safety-I and Safety-II: The Past and Future of Safety Management, Ashgate, Farnham, UK, 235 pp., ISBN 9781472423085, 2014.
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D. D., & Leveson, N. (2006). Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts. Ashgate.
Dekker, S.: Drift into Failure: From Hunting Broken Components to Understanding Complex Systems, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1201/9781315257396
Shannon, C. E.: A mathematical theory of communication, Bell Syst. Tech. J., 27, 379–423, https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1948.tb01338.x, 1948.
Csikszentmihalyi, M.: Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, 1990. ISBN: 978-0060920432.

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